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1 Introduction
One of the main goals of health care nancing systems is to promote ecient levels and
types of care (Ellis and McGuire [1993]). A stumbling block is the fact that insured patients
might demand larger than optimal quantities, connoted moral hazard. Zeckhauser [1970] and
Zweifel and Manning [2000] have analyzed how demand-side cost sharing can be used as a
corrective. However, demand-side cost sharing exposes consumers to risk, contradicting the
very objective of insurance. Unless limited by a stop-loss feature, it might also make benecial
procedures unaordable to patients (Nyman [1999]).
These considerations have created interest in the alternative of supply-side cost sharing.
Because of their information advantage, providers of medical care can inuence the demand
for their services to a greater extent than other professionals (Arrow [1963]). If paid fee-
for-service, they share patients' incentive for too much or too expensive care. Supply-side
cost sharing is designed to make them oppose their patients' moral hazard (McGuire [2000]).
However, it might also lead to the denial of benecial but costly services, a phenomenon
commonly termed stinting (Newhouse [2002]).
Both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been empirically examined in terms
of their eectiveness (see section 2). The novelty of this paper is that it directly compares the
expenditure eects of demand-side and supply-side cost sharing, using contract variants oered
by the same health insurer. This has the advantage that many side conditions (underwriting
policy, billing procedure) are kept constant. Moreover, it complements Lehmann and Zweifel
[2004], who construct a proxy for unobserved health status from prior HCE, by the two-stage
residual inclusion estimator (2SRI, Terza et al. [2008]). In this way, self-selection eects are
more fully controlled for. Finally, it extends the set of instruments inuencing choice of plan
but not HCE by including the premium for the baseline contract, the potential premium
reduction for a restricted plan, the individual's credit record, and years of membership with
the same fund. For the capitated plan, an additional instrument is a dummy indicating
whether or not an independent practice association (IPA) was operative in the county of the
individual.
Focusing on expenditure eects, this paper neglects other aspects of patient well-being.
However, it is important to note that consumers in the data have annual free choice of contract
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(without pre-selection by employers or government agencies).1 If, for example, a managed-
care type plan is too restrictive compared to the premium rebate that is oered, it will not be
chosen. Similarly, low income individuals are less likely to chose a high deductible, because
transfers from health insurance to the ill are most benecial if they are large compared to
income (Nyman [1999]).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of
the empirical literature. The policy setting is described in Section 3 while section 4 is devoted
to a description of the data base. In Section 5, we explain the econometric methods used to
separate moral hazard from self-selection eects and to deal with the very skewed distribution
of HCE data. The estimation results are presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses policy
implications in view of related literature, while the nal section 8 contains a summary and
conclusions.
2 Literature Review
In order to keep this review concise, we focus on empirical papers that measure moral hazard
in health insurance. When individuals have a choice of plan, self-selection eects need to be
accounted for because those who expect high future HCE are more likely to opt for more
comprehensive insurance. A small number of researchers have avoided this selection problem
by beneting from randomized experiments (the famous RAND study; Manning et al. [1987])
or natural experiments (Chiappori et al. [1998], Eichner [1998], or Winkelmann [2004]). Other
papers have used econometric techniques to address endogenous plan choice. Many econo-
metric approaches require for identication the availability of at least one variable that in-
uences contract choice but not utilization (an `identifying instrument'). Pertinent studies
from Switzerland are Schellhorn [2001], Gern and Schellhorn [2006] and Gardiol et al. [2006].
The former two rely on premium level and supplementary hospital insurance as identifying
instruments, while the latter uses death as an indicator of morbidity which is unaected by
insurance. Using Australian data, Cameron et al. [1988] advocate income as determinant of
insurance coverage but not utilization. In the US, employers play a strong role in determining
the individual's choice of plan, so they can be used as identifying instruments. For example,
1Low income individuals, currently about 30 percent of the population, are eligible to premium subsidies.
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Dowd et al. [1991] and Cardon and Hendel [2001] exploit the fact that dierent employers oer
dierent premiums and co-payment levels, while Deb and Trivedi [2009] use the employer's
type (public or private), the size of the rm and whether or not the employer oers both
HMO and non-HMO options.
Turning to estimation techniques, one notices that instrumental variable estimators are
not often applied to non-linear frameworks. An early exception are Dowd et al. [1991] who
estimate a tobit model with a correction for selectivity (Lee [1978]). However, their approach
requires strict distributional assumptions such as homoscedasticity. Deb and Trivedi [2009]
and Deb et al. [2006] also specify a fully parametric model of both choice and utilization
equations, which is jointly estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. As health care ex-
penditure data are extremely skewed and the distribution of the `tail' is dicult to specify
correctly, Terza et al. [2008] advocate the two-stage residual inclusion estimator. It yields
consistent estimates in a wide range of non-linear least squares settings.
Studies that have addressed endogeneity in non-linear panel data models are even more
rare. Non-linear xed-eects models are plagued by the incidental parameters problem (see
Lancaster [2000] for an overview, or Chamberlain [1980] for a corrective). In random eects
specications, the incidental parameters problem can be avoided by integrating out the indi-
vidual specic eects (Vella and Verbeek [1998] and Vella and Verbeek [1999]). However, this
again requires a parametric specication of their distribution.
An alternate approach of exploiting the information of panel data was pioneered by Wolfe
and Godderies [1991]. It uses HCE from prior years to proxy unobserved dierences be-
tween individuals which become predetermined in the year the comparison between plans is
performed (Lehmann and Zweifel [2004], Van Kleef et al. [2008]). In this paper, a mixture
between the IV and the `health proxy' approach will be applied.
3 Swiss Health Insurance
Swiss health insurance is of the `managed competition' type (Enthoven [1978], Van de Ven
et al. [2007]). Coverage is mandatory for a rather comprehensive `basic' basket of medical
services and pharmaceuticals, written by some 80 private, not-for-prot insurers competing
in a regulated market. Free consumer choice of plan is a distinctive feature of the system.
Supply-side and Demand-side Cost Sharing in Deregulated Social Health Insurance 5
There is no pre-selection of plans by employers or government agencies and insurers must
accept all applicants during annual open enrollment periods. Premium subsidies for low-
income individuals are funded out of general tax. Premiums can be dierentiated by area
of residence but not by health risk. Reductions are possible for young adults (19-25) and
individuals who receive accident coverage through the employer.
In the baseline contract, insured individuals enjoy unlimited access to all licensed physi-
cians and most hospitals in their region of residence. They face a minimum annual deductible
of CHF 300 (some EUR 200 as of 2006) and a co-insurance rate of 10 percent up to a cap
of CHF 700 (EUR 470) per year. Physicians in independent practice are reimbursed fee-
for-service according to an administered fee schedule that is collectively bargained between
the providers' and the insurers' associations. Hospitals receive per diems for patients treated
(the introduction of a DRG system is under way). The cantons2 nance hospital investment
and one-half of operational cost. While this system is generally found to ensure access to
comprehensive health care to all citizens, it is criticized for high and rapidly increasing HCE,
lack of co-ordination between providers, and lack of information about quality and eciency
(OECD [2006]).
In response to these problems, insurers have been granted the right to oer managed-care
type options (since 1994) and higher deductibles (since 1996) in return for lower premiums.
However, policy makers feared that these options would attract low risks. In addition to
a risk adjustment scheme based on age and sex, they imposed limits on possible premium
reductions. For voluntary deductibles, these are xed percentages of the base premium or 80
percent of the additional risk (deductible minus 300), whichever is less. The eligible deductible
levels are also regulated, as shown in Table 1. In managed-care type contracts, the insurer
must prove that the reduction is justied by eciency gains rather than self-selection eects.
Furthermore, it must not exceed 20 percent during the rst ve years since the launch of the
contract. The same deductible levels apply to managed care-type and FFS plans.
2Switzerland is divided into 26 cantons, with population ranging from 1,307,600 (Zurich) to 15,500 (Ap-
penzell i.R.), Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oce, www.bfs.admin.ch.
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Table 1: Regulation of deductibles and maximum premium reductions, 2006
Deductible level in CHF / Year 300 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Max reduction in percent of the base premium - 5 15 30 38 43
Max absolute reduction: 0.8 * (Deductible - 300) - 160 560 960 1,360 1,760
CHF 1  EUR 0.66
4 Data
The data base consists of individual records of more than 160,000 Swiss adults insured by
CSS, a major Swiss insurer, and covering the years 2003 - 2006. It includes age, gender,
residential location, contract choice, and HCE. Individuals who were not observed over the
entire four years are excluded from the analysis, with death constituting the main cause.
While the deathbound are known to cause a considerable amount of HCE, they exhibit an
idiosyncratic pattern of health care utilization (see Werblow et al. [2007]), justifying separate
analysis. The inuence of closeness to death also calls for exclusion of individuals who died
during 2007.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics according to contract choice as of 2006. For simplicity,
deductibles are grouped into three categories (low: 300, medium: 500, high:  1,000 CHF
per annum). More than 70 percent of those who chose a deductible in excess of CHF 500
opted for the CHF 1,500 level. As the other deductible levels where chosen by a small number
of individuals each, including them separately would have lead to considerable instability,
especially in the contract choice equation (see section 5). Furthermore, observed HCE across
the high deductible levels appeared to be similar.3
Buyers of the high-deductible plans are younger and more likely to be male than those with
a low deductible. Their mean HCE amounts to CHF 1,057 or 23 percent of that pertaining
to individuals with the minimum deductible. The fraction of those reporting positive HCE is
57 rather than 88 percent. If only those with positive HCE are taken into account, the mean
is CHF 1,804 or 34 percent of the low-deductible benchmark, respectively. These dierences
3For patients with high deductibles, it is questionable how well their HCE are observed. In earlier work
(e.g. Lehmann and Zweifel [2004]), only HCE in excess of the deductible was analyzed on the grounds that
patients have no incentive to submit their claims unless HCE exceeds the deductible. However, with the
raise of electronic billing systems, the lion's share of billings are now transmitted directly from providers to
insurers. The deductible is then billed to the patient by the insurer. In some cantons, physicians even decided
to abandon direct-to-consumer billings completely. CSS has conducted an internal study relating the share of
direct-to-consumer billing to HCE below the deductible. The variable did not increase the explanatory power
of the model. In our dataset, 24% of those with positive cost had cost below their deductible.
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point to sizeable eects of demand-side cost sharing (which still need to be corrected for
self-selection eects, see below).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics According to Type of Contract
Contract N Age Male HCE Share with HCE4
HCE > 0 if >0
Low DED, FFS (baseline contract) 84,053 55 0.4 4,610 0.88 5,230
(18) (0.49) (8,961) (0.33) (9,378)
Medium DED, FFS 31,573 54 0.43 3,229 0.81 3,908
(16) (0.49) (6,962) (0.38) (7,522)
High DED, FFS 38,386 45 0.54 1,057 0.57 1,804
(13) (0.5) (3,593) (0.49) (4,580)
Low DED, IPA 4,942 54 0.44 2,933 0.85 3,427
(17) (0.5) (5,999) (0.35) (6,355)
Medium DED, IPA 1,134 49 0.45 1,686 0.78 2,121
(15) (0.45) (3,654) (0.41) (3,999)
High DED, IPA 3,598 43 0.56 834 0.58 1,415
(12) (0.56) (3,431) (0.49) (4,368)
N = 163,686, CHF 1 EUR 0.66, Standard deviations in parentheses
DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practitioners Association
Turning to the supply-side cost sharing alternative (lower half of table 2), one notices
that the high-deductible variant is again characterized by a comparatively low mean age
and a higher share of men. Average HCE is CHF 828 or 28 percent of the low-deductible
benchmark of CHF 2,934. The share of individuals with positive HCE is 58 percent rather
than 85 percent, while mean HCE conditional on being positive amounts to CHF 1,408 or 41
percent of the benchmark.
However, the HCE values for the IPA plans are lower throughout than for the conventional
FFS plans with the same deductible level. This may well be due to changed incentives facing
physicians. Similar to the United States, participating physicians (mainly general practition-
ers) are paid a risk-adjusted capitation payment designed to cover all services rendered or
prescribed up to a threshold of CHF 10,000 per patient and year. Beyond that limit, the
insurer reimburses 90 percent of cost FFS. Capitation payments are adjusted for age, gender,
deductible level, hospitalization during previous year, nursing home stay during previous year,
and 21 pharmaceutical cost groups. The pharmaceutical cost groups are similar to those used
in the Dutch risk adjustment scheme (Lamers and Van Vliet [2003]). While the insurer does
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not impose guidelines or utilization reviews, many networks run them internally, combined
with quality monitoring by independent auditors in some cases.
In order to get a preliminary indication of the extent to which the cost dierences may
be caused by self-selection eects, it is instructive to compare the HCE of consumers who
switch to higher deductibles and IPA plans with that of those who do not (see Table 3).
The switchers from a low-deductible FFS plan in 2005 to a high-deductible one had caused
HCE of CHF 826, a mere 19 percent of the non-switchers. Those changing to a medium-
deductible alternative had caused HCE amounting to CHF 1,916 in 2005, or 44 percent of
the non-switchers. Switchers who moved from a FFS to an IPA plan had cost CHF 1,600,
or 49 percent of the stayers. These gures point to substantial self-selection eects in both
demand-side and supply-side cost sharing.
Table 3: Prior-year Mean HCE of Switchers and Non-switchers
Switch at the start 2006 FFS, low DED FFS, low DED FFS(all DED)
to Medium DED to High DED to Capitated IPA
Non-Switchers 4,315 4,315 3,230
Switchers 1,916 826 1,597
DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practitioners Association
CHF 1 EUR 0.66 in 2006
5 Econometric Model
5.1 Developing a Proxy for Unobserved Health Status
The dataset does not contain direct information on health status such as diagnostic codes,
restrictions on activities of daily living, or self-reported health. However, panel data allows to
develop an indicator of health status from prior HCE (see Van Kleef et al. [2008], Lehmann
and Zweifel [2004], Wolfe and Godderies [1991]). In particular, Lehmann and Zweifel show
that residuals from a random-eects Tobit regression of prior HCE on exogenous variables
can serve as a proxy for unobserved health.
However, in view of considerable heteroscedasticity in the dataset, the two-part model
is preferable over the Tobit. The rst part is a random-eects probit model predicting the
probability of observing positive HCE for individual i in year t [see Eq. (1)]. The second part
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estimates the amount of HCE given that it is positive. The log transformation serves to reduce
the skewness of the dependent variable. Equation (2) can also be justied by noting that an
individual's health is to be seen relative to her age, gender, and regional peers. The present
panel is unbalanced, as many individuals had positive HCE in some but not in all years. A
Wooldridge test of serial correlation in the error term (Wooldridge [2002]) rejected the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Therefore, the feasible generalized least squares procedure
proposed for unbalanced panels by Baltagi and Wu [1999] is applied to gain eciency while
avoiding biased estimation of standard errors. The model applied for deriving the health
status proxy thus reads (all error terms assumed normally distributed),
Pr(HCEi;t > 0) = (a+ Xi;t + i + i;t) (1)
log(HCEi;tjHCEi;t > 0) = b+ Xi;t + i + i;t (2)
with i;t =   i;t 1 + i;t
Eqs (1) and (2) are estimated on the rst three years of the dataset, ie 2003 to 2005. Explana-
tory variables are age, age interacted with gender, urbanization, area of residence and a year
dummy to account for ination. Estimation results are shown in appendix A. Deviations from
the expected value of HCE are averaged over the three years in order to reduce the inuence
of transitory health shocks.5
5.2 Endogeneity of Contract Choice
Even if the proxy can suciently control for unobserved dierences in current health status,
there are additional unmeasured variables that may cause someone opting for the minimum
deductible to have a great deal of HCE, resulting in an overestimation of moral hazard eects.
Examples are private information about probabilities of future illness, general attitude towards
medical care, and previous experience with the health care system. Ignoring these confounders
will lead to omitted variable bias in the HCE equation. Terza et al. [2008] show that the
5Note that while only individuals with the baseline contract are included here, estimated coecients will
be used to predict individual HCE for the whole sample. This has the advantage that endogeneity of contract
choice does not bias estimators. However, calculating the proxy including all individuals did not change the
results.
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residuals from an equation modeling contract choice are good estimators of these confounders.
Therefore, including these residuals into the HCE equation alongside observed contract choice
and the proxy for latent health serves to control for unobserved confounders (two stage residual
inclusion estimation, 2SRI). The 2SRI method yields also consistent estimates if the HCE
equation is nonlinear. However, it requires equations for contract choice to be specied.
For identication, at least one explanatory variable in the contract choice equation must
not appear in the HCE equation. Five such variables are available.
1. Baseline Premium: A high baseline premium increases the attractiveness of higher-
deductible and IPA options. At the same time, there is little reason that premiums
should inuence health care consumption. The income eects of premiums on health
care consumption are limited in the Swiss case because some 30 percent of the population
(those with low-incomes) are eligible to a premium subsidy. Moreover, preliminary esti-
mations showed that premiums do not inuence HCE when other factors are controlled
for.6
2. Absolute premium reductions for a higher-deductible or an IPA option: While higher
rebates make these contract options more attractive, they do not inuence health care
consumption for the reasons described in 1.
3. Number of years of CSS membership:7 Long-standing members are known not to switch
contracts, making them less likely to opt for a higher-deductible or an IPA option. How-
ever, loyalty is correlated with health status because consumers who develop chronic con-
ditions face a premium hike if they sign up with another insurer for the supplementary
component (which they usually prefer to have from the same insurer to avoid ambiguity
as to responsibility for payment). Nevertheless, preliminary estimations showed it to be
insignicant in the HCE equation when entered in combination with the health status
proxy. It therefore qualies as identifying restriction.
4. Dummy indicating a bad credit record: This may reect lower income, which is relevant
for contract choice. At the same time, a bad credit record proved unrelated to HCE,
6Premium levels were also used as identifying instruments in Schellhorn [2001].
7This variable is truncated at 1999 because retrieving data from previous years is cumbersome. There was
a change in IT architecture in 1998.
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once the proxy for health status was included.
5. IPA ocially on oer within the individual's zipcode area: This proved to be unre-
lated to utilization if regional dierences were controlled for by dummies. However, the
availability of an IPA importantly favors the choice of the corresponding option.
Modeling the choice of deductible calls for an ordered probit model, while for the choice of
the IPA a probit model is sucient. Starting with the latter for simplicity, the generalized
residuals are given by Gourieroux et al. [1987]. Let hi be an indicator variable equal to one if
the IPA plan was chosen and zero otherwise, zi a vector of covariates, and ^ a vector of the
estimated coecients. Then the generalized residuals are given by
u^i = hi  (z
0
i^)
(z0i^)
+ [1  hi]   (z
0
i^)
1  (z0i^)
=
[hi   (z0i^)](z0i^)
[1  (z0i^)](z0i^)
; (3)
where  denotes the cumulative and , the standard normal density respectively. In the same
spirit, the generalized residuals for multinomial or ordered choice models have been dened by
Vella [1993]. Let there be i= 1.... N individuals choosing from k = 1...K ordered alternatives,
and dik denote an indicator function taking the value 1 if individual i has chosen alternative
k and zero otherwise. Then the generalized residual is
v^i = 
K
k=1dik
^ik[dik   ^ik]
[1  ^ik]^ik
(4)
with ^ik denoting the estimated probability that individual i chooses the k-th alternative
and ^ik, the estimated value of the density at that point. These two quantities are determined
as follows. Let ^ be the vector of estimated coecients from the ordered probit and ^k, the
estimated cut points with 0 =  1, and K = 1. Then,
^ik = (k 1   z0i^)  (k   z0i^) and ^ik = (k 1   z0i^)  (k   z0i^): (5)
5.3 Specication of the Outcome Equations
The distribution of HCE has a cumulation point at zero. Among the alternatives available
for dealing with this fact, the two-part model is preferred over e.g. the Tobit model for two
reasons. First, the zeros are perceived as reecting choices rather than missing values (see
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Jones [2000]). Second, both supply- and demand-side cost sharing are known to aect the
decision to use health care in a dierent manner than they aect the decision how much care
to use.
The rst part of the two-part model is often specied by probit and estimated by maximum
likelihood. However, with the inclusion of the residuals of the contract choice variables, the
errors are non-normally distributed and maximum likelihood is not consistent. Instead, a
glm estimation with a probit link is applied. This method is consistent as long as E(djx) =
(x), with d denoting an indicator that equals one if HCE > 0 and zero otherwise. Normal
distribution of the error terms is not required (Cameron and Trivedi [2005]).8
The specication of the second part (HCEjHCE > 0) has been discussed by Manning
[1998] and Manning and Mullahy [2001] (MM hereafter). Because of the positive skewness
of the dependent variable, raw-scale estimates can be imprecise even in large datasets. The
log transformation is often used to mitigate skewness, with coecients interpreted as (semi-)
elasticities of the mean response. However, Manning [1998] shows that if the error variance
is heteroscedastic in a way that is correlated with the covariates, these coecients are no
longer consistent elasticity estimates. Moreover, absolute savings due to cost sharing may be
of interest, calling for a retransformation of predicted values.
Blough et al. [1999], MM and others suggest estimating ln(E[yjx; y > 0]) directly by a
GLM procedure with a log link (i.e. ln(E[yjx; y > 0]) = x) and an appropriate variance
function. As MM point out, the GLM estimates are consistent as long as the mean function is
correctly specied, but might lead to imprecise estimates if the residuals are positively skewed
even after transformation to log. Following the procedure for model selection suggested by
MM, we start with a consistent GLM procedure, the gamma regression. The kurtosis of the
residuals on the log scale is 3.53. This creates a tradeo between imprecision (GLM) and
possible bias (OLS applied to ln(y)). In this work, GLM is used because taking heteroscedas-
ticity into account is deemed more important than precision. Given GLM, a Park test is
performed to select the variance function. The estimated  is 1.81, which is closest to the
gamma specication.
The residuals from the contract choice equation are estimates rather than observations.
8There is no contradiction to Terza et al. [2008], who suggested estimation by non-linear least squares.
Although it goes by a dierent name, GLM is an iteratively reweighted nonlinear least squares estimator
(Hardin and Hilbe [2007]).
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Not accounting for this in the outcome estimation could lead to downward biased estimates
of the standard errors (Heckman [1976]). Therefore, the standard errors were obtained by
bootstrapping.9
6 Results
6.1 Eects of Demand-Side and Supply-Side Cost Sharing
The results for the rst part of the two-part model are shown in the rst three columns of
Table 4. The rst column pertains to the full model. The second column excludes the residuals
from the contract choice equation. The third column shows a naive specication that also
excludes the proxy for health status. For the variables of interest (DED, IPA), marginal eects
are calculated for a representative individual (in italics below the coecients), ie a woman
at the age of 52, living in a suburban community in the Zurich region, having the baseline
contract plus accident coverage, and a supplement covering alternative medicine. The health
proxy is taken at its sample average. This individual's estimated probability of positive HCE
is roughly 91 percent. For interaction terms, marginal eects are calculated according to the
formulas provided by Norton et al. [2004].10
Regardless of the specication, voluntary deductibles progressively reduce the probability
of positive HCE; however, their eect is about seven times smaller in the full and restricted
than in the naive specication, pointing to considerable self-selection eects based on health
status. On the other hand, they cannot be said to depend on the type of plan (DED *
IPA insignicant). By way of contrast, membership in an IPA is associated with a higher
probability of positive HCE (signicant only in the restricted model). This may be the
eect of preventive services oered. For example, one large IPA hands out vouchers for free
immunizations against the u in the fall. The variable `drugs via pharmacy' measures the
percentage of drug expenditure sold by pharmacies as opposed to physicians in the individual's
9The estimation was repeated 400 times after resampling with replacement (clustered by patient). In our
specic application, the bootstrapped standard errors turned out to be similar to those obtained in the original
estimation.
10To be specic, let a and b be the coecients of two dummies, ab the coecient of their interaction and
x0 the inuence of all other variables at representative values. The marginal eect of the interaction term is
(a + b + ab + x0) (a + x0) (b + x0) +(x0). For a dummy without interaction, the marginal
eect is (a + x0)   (x0). As these marginal eects are combinations of all coecients, their standard
errors are calculated by the delta method. The calculations are run in STATA using the nlcom command.
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Table 4: Estimation Results from the Two-part Model
P(C>0), glm with probit link CjC>0, glm with log link
Full Restricted Naive Full Restricted Naive
Auent community 0.039 0.041 0.056** 0.023 0.025 0.044
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Regional center -0.052** -0.052** -0.036* -0.092** -0.090** -0.084**
(0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Rural -0.019 -0.019 0.003 -0.027 -0.027 -0.008
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020)
Berne city 0.077** 0.077** 0.036 0.057 0.056 0.014
(0.031) (0.028) (0.024) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035)
Lucerne city 0.044 0.034 -0.033 -0.237*** -0.231*** -0.272***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.06) (0.065) (0.062)
Geneva city 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.122**
(0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039)
Health proxy 0.473*** 0.469*** 0.523*** 0.521***
(0.01) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
(Health proxy)2 -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.085*** -0.085***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
(Health proxy)3 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Suppl. hospital 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.155*** 0.030* 0.028 0.072***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Suppl. altern. med. 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.085*** -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.063***
(0.01) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Drugs via pharmacy 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.132* -0.050 -0.042 0.036
(0.069) (0.069) (0.060) (0.092) (0.097) (0.093)
v^i DED 0.059 -0.332
(0.145) (0.254)
u^i IPA -0.046*** -0.006
(0.013) (0.019)
Medium DED -0.042** -0.079*** -0.265*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.260***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
-0.007** -0.013*** -0.055***
Medium DED * IPA 0.084 0.083 0.122* 0.013 -0.001 0.053
(0.066) (0.061) (0.054) (0.071) (0.078) (0.075)
0.012 0.013 0.025**
High DED -0.207*** -0.295*** -0.869*** -0.182*** -0.191*** -0.837***
(0.026) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
-0.037*** -0.054*** -0.241***
High DED * IPA 0.043 0.043 0.126*** 0.066 0.054 0.188***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.071) (0.059) (0.057)
0.011 0.014* 0.034***
IPA 0.072 0.086** -0.066** -0.118* -0.189*** -0.418***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.025) (0.059) (0.035) (0.033)
0.011 0.012*** -0.012*
AIC 0.676 0.676 0.885 18.088 18.088 18.365
N 163,686 163,686 163,686 128,744 128,744 128,744
DED = Deductible, IPA = Independent Practitioners Association, Standard errors in parentheses,
Marginal eects in italics. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Additional regressors are age, gender, additional types of municipalities and areas, accident insurance.
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area of residence. Some cantons allow physicians to dispense pharmaceuticals on their own
account, creating an incentive to over-prescribe. However, this fact does not seem to have
an impact on HCE.11 Finally, it is noteworthy that the squared and the cubic form of the
health proxy are highly signicant as well. The impact of past, time-invariant health status
on current expenditure does not appear to be linear over the whole distribution of HCE.
In the second part of the model, the amount of HCE is estimated (last three columns of
Table 4). Higher voluntary deductibles are again found to progressively reduce HCE regardless
of specication. This time, the full and restricted models point to eects that are four times
smaller than according to the naive model. Type of contract does not play a role (DED * IPA
insignicant). Turning to the IPA alternative, one notices a reduction of HCE amounting from
12 (full model) to 19 percent (restricted model), less than one-half of the estimate suggested
by the naive specication.
6.2 Estimating Overall Eects
In a practical context, cost savings in actual Francs are often of interest rather than logs or
probabilities. Unlike relative savings, these depend on the expenditure level of the subpop-
ulation in question.12 The results are displayed in Table 5. For estimate (1), expected HCE
according to type of contract is estimated by predicting the product of the probability of
positive HCE and the amount of HCE. For instance, individuals with the baseline contract
had expected HCE of CHF 4,320 (the reference value), while those with a high deductible
combined with the IPA option had CHF 843 only. Note that the value of CHF 843 is the
estimated average expenditure of the individuals who actually chose the high deductible and
IPA contract. In order to estimate the expenditure of the same subpopulation assuming
they had chosen the baseline contract, the dummies for deductibles and IPA plans are set to
zero when predicting expected HCE. The results are shown as estimate (2) of Table 5. For
example, estimate (2) for the subpopulation in the high-deductible combined with the IPA
option amounts to CHF 1,111. As estimates (2) assume everybody to have chosen the base-
line contract, dierences from the reference value amount to pure risk-selection eects. For
11The existing literature on the issue is inconclusive. For example, Vatter and Ruei [2003] and Trottmann
[2011] nd physician dispensing to lower HCE, while Beck et al. [2004] and Zweifel [1985] nd a positive eect.
12If, for example, a group of very healthy individuals reduces their spending by 20 percent, the amount saved
in absolute Francs is lower than if an average group does the same.
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individuals in the high-deductible-and-IPA option, these are estimated at CHF 3,209 (4,320 -
1,111).
Table 5: Eects of Cost Sharing on Expected HCE
Minimum DED Medium DED High DED
FFS IPA FFS IPA FFS IPA
Avg\HCE, estimate (1) 4,320 2,985 3,180 2,023 1,100 843
SE (29) (99) (37) (159) (23) (55)
Avg\HCE, estimate (2) 3,340 3,430 2,374 1,422 1,111
SE (133) (34) (124) (57) (78)
Selection, (ref.) - (2) 980 891 1,946 2,898 3,209
Moral Hazard, (2) - (1) 355 250 351 322 267
Estimate (1): Expected HCE per contract
Estimate (2): Expected HCE of same individuals, assuming they had chosen the minimum
deductible and no IPA. CHF 1 EUR 0.66
Estimates (1) and (2) of the same column show predicted HCE for the same group of
individuals, with (1) taking plan choice as observed and (2) assuming everyone to have chosen
the baseline contract. Then, the dierence between estimates (1) and (2) within one column
is the estimated incentive eect; for high deductibles combined with IPA, it amounts to CHF
267 (=1,111 - 843). Note that while this number seems rather low, it amounts to 24 percent
of the predicted cost for this subpopulation assuming they were in the baseline contract. As
these individuals are healthy on average, their potential for cost savings in absolute Francs is
lower than that of sicker individuals. For individuals in the high deductible and FFS option,
the estimated moral hazard reduction amounts to CHF 322 (=1,422 - 1,100). Finally, the
IPA option combined with the minimum deductible prots from moderate risk selection and
achieves an absolute moral hazard reduction of CHF 355.
6.3 Specication Tests
In order to test the validity of our results, several alternate specications were applied. In
the rst and the third column of Table 6, results are shown for a pooled glm estimation over
the years 2004 - 2006 (standard errors are clustered by patient). The proxy was calculated
per year using data from the respective previous year. The estimated incentive eects are
stronger, likely because the incidence of chronic illness is not controlled for. Column 2 and 4
show the results of pooled estimations over the years 2005 and 2006. The proxy was calculated
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over the two previous years. With the exception of the IPA option at the rst stage of the
model, the estimates are close to the ones obtained by the original approach.
Finally, a xed eects specication was used on the second part of the two-part model.13 The
target variable here is the log of cost over the years 2004 - 2006. For the high deductible
and the IPA, the estimated incentive eects are close to those in Table 4. For the medium
deductible, the direct incentive eect is weaker and insignicant, but the interaction term
with the IPA is stronger.
Table 6: Specication Tests Using Other Time Horizons or Fixed Eects
P(C>0), glm with probit link CjC>0, glm with log link Fixed Eects
Proxy Calculation 1 year 2 year 1 year 2 year Ln(CjC>0)
2004-06 2005-06 2004-06 2005-06 2004-06
Medium DED -0.137*** -0.097*** -0.117*** -0.074*** -0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Medium DED * IPA 0.055 0.080 -0.037 -0.047 -0.154*
(0.043) (0.059) (0.060) (0.081) (0.071)
High DED -0.441*** -0.329*** -0.265*** -0.185*** -0.149***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017)
High DED * IPA 0.093*** 0.070* -0.041 -0.077 -0.091
(0.024) (0.030) (0.048) (0.056) (0.049)
IPA -0.100*** -0.061* -0.284*** -0.201*** -0.108*
(0.022) (0.029) (0.048) (0.060) (0.043)
N 475,107 325,442 372,091 256,166 372,091
Additional regressors are equal to those in Table 4. The health proxy was calculated yearly.
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
The switchers allow for an alternate testing strategy. Here, the target variable is the
dierence in cost from one year to the next. This dierence is symmetrically distributed, so
the estimations were run by an untransformed linear random eects model. As the estimated
incentive eects in Table 5 are calculated relative to the baseline contract, they are comparable
to the eect of a switch away from the baseline. Column 1 of Table 7 shows the number of
observations for each type of switch, column 2 shows the estimated coecients. In the medium
and high deductible case, the estimates are in the range of those in Table 5. For the IPA
options,the estimated eects in the switcher regression are smaller than those in Table 5. The
standard errors in the switcher estimation are larger, likely because of the limited number of
13It was not applied to the rst part because of the incidental parameters problem (see Section 2).
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switchers observed.
Table 7: Analysis of the Switchers
Switch From Baseline Contract Number of Switchers Random Eects Regression
Coecient SE
... to DED med, FFS 2,139 -212.99 (130.06)
... to DED high, FFS 13,503 -387.99*** (53.27)
... to DED low, IPA 1,905 -260.27 (111.07)
... to DED med, IPA 88 -189.229 (454.35)
... to DED high, IPA 805 -219.12 (161.17)
Additional regressors are equal to those in Table 4.
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001.
6.4 Which Types of Medical Care Are Most Aected by Cost Sharing?
In order to analyze the eects of cost sharing in more detail, the estimation technique described
in section 5 is applied to general practitioners' services, specialists, drugs, physical therapy,
outpatient hospital services and inpatient hospital services. Note that all services rendered by
qualied specialists are attributed to `specialist medicine' although qualied specialists might
also provide primary care services. In line with the four part model advocated by Duan et al.
[1982], the probability of observing positive hospital expenditure is estimated only for the
individuals with positive outpatient expenditure.
A medium deductible signicantly reduces the probability of GPs, drugs and hospital
outpatient services. For specialized medicine, a signicantly positive inuence is estimated,
which contradicts intuition. A high deductible reduces the probability of all types of care. The
impact on hospital inpatient care is surprising as most patients have used up the deductible
before entering a hospital. However, patients with high deductibles are less likely to enter
the whole process of diagnostic testing and procedures, which also reduces the probability of
being hospitalized. The IPA-option is found to encourage the use of GP, specialists and drugs
but discourages the use of physical therapy and hospital services.
Turning to the second part of the two-part model, a medium deductible has a negative
impact on the utilization of GP services and drugs. A high deductible reduces the amount of
GP care, specialist medicine and drugs. Finally, the IPA option reduces the expenditure for
almost all types, most strongly for specialists and drugs. As fees of specialists and hospitals
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Table 8: Incentive Eects per Type of Care
GP Specialist Drugs Physical Hospital Hospital
Therapy Outpatient Inpatient
DED Med P(C>0) -0.034*** 0.024* -0.076*** 0.004 -0.019* -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
CjC>0 -0.048*** -0.018 -0.090*** -0.026 -0.045 -0.045
(0.008) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026)
DED High P(C>0) -0.270*** -0.143*** -0.340*** -0.107*** -0.092*** -0.039**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015)
CjC>0 -0.154*** -0.087*** -0.137*** 0.004 0.039 -0.050
(0.011) (0.018) (0.038) (0.021) (0.039) (0.036)
IPA P(C>0) 0.088*** 0.103** 0.087* -0.049** -0.058*** -0.066**
(0.016) (0.032) (0.037) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022)
CjC>0 -0.084*** -0.153*** -0.156** -0.058* -0.088 -0.116*
(0.016) (0.023) (0.053) (0.029) (0.046) (0.046)
AIC P(C>0) 1.042 1.109 0.822 0.820 1.061 0.614
CjC>0 14.41 15.31 15.233 15.254 16.043 19.751
N P(C>0) 163,686 163,686 163,686 163,686 163,686 128,744
CjC>0 101,265 86,208 112,941 28,241 46,923 17,205
Additional regressors are equal to those in Table 4
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
are regulated to be equal in the FFS and the IPA sector, the expenditure eect is due to a
reduction in quantity only.14
7 Discussion
The aim of this section is to discuss the policy implications of our results, relating them to
recent literature. A rst surprising result is that the estimated absolute cost reduction due to
a deductible of CHF 500 rather than 300 (CHF 250, see Table 5 again) exceeds the maximum
increase in out-of-pocket expenditure (CHF 200 = 500 - 300). This is conrmed by two other
recent studies using Swiss data from earlier years when the minimum deductible was CHF
230 and the next lowest CHF 400 (see Table 9).
14In order to validate our results, we reestimated the second part of the model by ols on log expenditure.
The estimates are close and equal in sign. The only exception it the coecient for hospital outpatient services,
which is signicantly negative in the OLS estimation. It is not a priori clear which is more plausible for this
heterogenous patient group. Some patients are chronically ill and in need of repeated procedures (suggesting
no eect), while others visit the emergency room for relatively minor ailments (where deductibles might well
be eective).
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Table 9: Estimated Deductible Eects in Earlier Papers
Van Kleef et al. [2008]
Deductible levels (FFS, 2003) 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
Estimated Moral Hazard Reduction 3 382 443 276 318
Gardiol et al. [2005]
Deductible levels (FFS, 2000) 230 400 600 1,200 1,500
Estimated Moral Hazard Reduction 697 512 306 62 0
CHF 1 EUR 0.66
Van Kleef et al. [2008] estimate that raising the deductible from CHF 230 to 400 would
serve to reduce expenditure by CHF 382, exceeding the maximum increase in out-of-pocket
expenditure by CHF 212. Gardiol et al. [2005] take the maximum deductible of CHF 1,500 as
the point of reference and calculate the incentive eects from there. The transition from the
medium deductible of CHF 400 to the minimum of CHF 230 is estimated to generate `true'
savings of CHF 185 (=697-512), which again exceeds the out-of-pocket dierence of CHF 170.
The second point relates to risk adjustment (RA). Note from Table 6 that estimated moral
hazard reductions not only fall far short of gross dierences in expected HCE as indicated
by estimates (1) but are markedly plan specic. Van Kleef et al. [2008] and Van Kleef et al.
[2006] discuss the challenges this varying mix of risk-selection and moral hazard eects poses
to regulators in a system which community rating and RA. The issue is the extent to which
insurers should be allowed to pass on gross savings to consumers. The appropriate amount
seems to be the amount of `true' savings net of risk-selection eects. Yet, Van Kleef et al.
[2006] show that if only very low risks opt for higher deductibles at rst, premium reductions
reecting `true' savings are too small to create incentives for these options.15 As a remedy, it
is benecial not to entirely net out risk-selection eects for determining allowable premium
reductions. Empirical evidence by Van Kleef et al. [2008] shows that the current RA schemes
of the Netherlands and Switzerland do leave room for risk-selection eects in the premium
reductions.
8 Conclusions
Managed competition in social health insurance aims at creating incentives for insurers to
increase eciency and respond to consumer preferences while preserving solidarity between
15This reects the Swiss experience after the introduction of voluntary deductibles in 1996.
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high- and low-risk types (Van de Ven et al. [2007]). Therefore, it is important to know whether
contractual innovations such as deductibles or capitated IPA plans achieve true cost savings
rather than merely serving as a means for risk selection. This research measures and compares
the impacts of demand-side cost sharing (through voluntary deductibles) and supply-side cost
sharing (through prepaid IPA plans) on total health care expenditure (HCE), controlling for
risk-selection eects. The data comes from a large panel of Swiss adults covering the years 2003
to 2006. Since unobserved health status inuences both contract choice and HCE, a proxy is
constructed from HCE during the rst three years of the observation period, complemented
by the residuals from the contract choice equation [two stage residual inclusion method (Terza
et al. [2008])].
Higher annual deductibles and IPA plans are both found to achieve marked reductions
of moral hazard. An increase in the deductible by CHF 200 (some EUR 133) decreases the
estimated probability of positive HCE during a given year by almost 1 percentage point, while
the IPA plan is associated with an increase of about 1.1 points. The amount of positive HCE
is reduced by some 7 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Increasing the deductible by CHF
700 (some EUR 466) reduces the probability of reporting HCE by about 3.7 percent and the
amount of positive HCE by about 18 percent.
Still, this research is subject to several limitations. First, since the data set only comprises
individuals who were with one and the same insurer from 2003 - 2006, it fails to measure risk-
selection eects associated with changes between competing insurers. Second, even `within'
risk-selection eects may not be controlled for perfectly. There is no guarantee that the HCE
equation is correctly specied for the three preceding years, yielding residuals that serve as
good proxies for unobserved health. The same caveat applies to the residuals of the contract
choice equations. Thus, estimates of expected HCE reductions achieved by higher deductibles
and IPA plans could still be biased. Third, the eects of the deductible option contain price
and income eects. As shown by Nyman [1999] only the former should be counted as inecient
consumption. Finally, results relating to IPA plans have limited generality as long as they
cannot be related in detail to the incentives faced by participating health care providers.
Nevertheless, the ndings permit to draw the conclusion that allowing insurers to oer
plans with both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing reduced spending in Swiss social
health insurance. After controlling for risk-selection eects, both variants are estimated to
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achieve marked reductions in moral hazard that can be passed on to consumers in the guise
of premium reductions without jeopardizing insurers' solvency.
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Appendices
A Estimating a Proxy for Health Status
Table 10: Results from the Random Eects Estimation
P(Cit >0) CitjCit >0
Random Eects Probit Random Eects AR (1)
Greater Metropolitan Area 0.018 -0.077***
(0.021) (0.010)
Auent Community 0.101* -0.069***
(0.041) (0.020)
Regional Center -0.083** -0.203***
(0.032) (0.017)
Rural, mainly industrial -0.070** -0.173***
(0.025) (0.013)
Rural, agriculture -0.171*** -0.209***
(0.028) (0.015)
Berne city 0.088** 0.037*
(0.033) (0.016)
Lucerne city -0.059* -0.241***
(0.028) (0.014)
Geneva city 0.396*** 0.385***
(0.042) (0.019)
2004 0.007 0.091***
(0.012) (0.005)
2005 0.017 0.089***
(0.012) (0.005)
Constant 1.928*** 6.911***
(0.036) (0.018)
N 253,653 218,208
 .691 .531
 .090
Additional regressors are age, gender and more areas.
Standard errors in parentheses,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
 Estimated autocorrelation coecient
 Fraction of error variance due to individual-specic term
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B Predicting Contract Choice
Table 11: Estimation of Contract Choice in 2006
Choice of Deductible Choice of prepaid IPA
Ordered Probit Probit
Health proxy -0.341*** -0.219***
(0.006) (0.012)
(Health proxy)2 0.042*** 0.055***
(0.003) (0.005)
(Health proxy)3 -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001)
Bad credit record -0.274*** -0.359***
(0.014) (0.027)
Years of CSS membership since 1999 -0.042*** -0.052***
(0.004) 0.007)
Baseline premium 0.018*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
Premium reduction for medium DED 0.008
(0.010)
Premium reduction for high DED 0.015***
(0.003)
Premium reduction for IPA 0.013***
(0.001)
IPA operational in zipcode area 1.436***
(0.058)
Constant -3.926***
(0.287)
Cut points 7.145 / 7.823
Log likelihood -140,618 -27,297
Number of observations 163,686 163,686
Additional regressors are age, gender, types of municipalities and areas, accident insurance,
supplemental insurance.
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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